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ITALY:I NCHING OUT OF THE
GLOBAL CRISIS
RICCARDO ROVELLI*
Despite being one of the large members of the EU,
when it comes to the world scenario Italy remains
just one in a group of several small advanced, open,
slow-growing economies, with little room to maneu-
ver by themselves, and no clear idea in which direc-
tion to play their limited options. This is even truer
now, in the grand scenario of 2010, as the world’s
worst economic crisis of the last seventy years has
been halted, and economies are slowly recovering,
but with no clear sign of direction and many unre-
solved issues that only temporarily have been
brushed aside.
The world economy has indeed been rescued.
Generally speaking, the measures adopted were
prompt,several had not been previously tested,and
many went against conventional (academic) wis-
dom. But they seem to have worked, which is even
more a tribute to those who decided to adopt them.
But rescue is not recovery.That will take more time
and will be more difficult to achieve, also because
recovery might take pressure away from painful
reforms.
In this paper I would like to highlight two aspects.
First, in order to get out of the recession, there was
little that Italy could do by itself, especially in terms
of short-run policies. Its monetary and exchange
rate policy is set by the European Central Bank
(ECB). Its fiscal policy is effectively blocked by its
enormous debt. Its ability to reform is hindered by
the lack of social and policy consensus, and by the
deterioration of the climate for public and policy
debates. In this respect, the policy choice has been
not to fight the recession head on, but to minimize
some of its social costs. Within these limits, results
have been positive.
Second, the measures that have been adopted are
going to have at best a modest influence on the
causes of Italy’s persistent slow growth. They are
qualitatively insufficient to promote a more sus-
tained recovery and to reactivate a growth process,
the engines of which have been stalled for quite
some time. One possible outcome is that Italy is
likely to remain a country in relative decline. But as
Italians were relatively well off before the crisis and
their plight is not uncommon in Europe, they will
find this situation not too alarming, at least for a
while. But as limited signs of a more positive deter-
mination to resume growth are also apparent (as I
will argue in the end) the final outcome might still
be different.
To develop my arguments, I will briefly relate to the
current state of the crisis in the first section;then dis-
cuss in the next section why the financial crisis
affected only marginally the Italian financial system.
In the third section I will briefly characterize the
transmission of the crisis to the economies of the
euro area, followed by the examination of govern-
ment response to the crisis in Italy.The final section
concludes.
Legacies of the crisis
The US house price bubble began to burst in Sep-
tember 2007, and the US stock markets began to
slide after 8 October 2007, followed by the rest of
the world. The slide became a crash after March
2008.On the real side,the US economy had reached
a peak in December 2007, while the euro area did
not peak until the first quarter of 2008. The first
signs of recovery came about a year later. Stock
markets seem to have bottomed out in March 2009
and also the real economy slowly began to grow in
the second half of 2009, both in Europe and in the
United States.
World output declined by 0.8 percent in 2009, and is
now expected to rise by 3.9 percent in 2010. In this
scenario growth will be 2.7 percent in the United
States, and only 1 percent in the Euro area (see * University of Bologna.CESifo Forum 1/2010 45
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Table 1).The main emerging markets are leading the
recovery, even more firmly than they were leading
growth before the crisis. Not only (with the excep-
tions of Russia and Mexico) they have decoupled
from the worst of the crisis, but they have re-assert-
ed a yearly growth differential of about 4 percent
against the advanced economies.This new balancing
of the world economy does not show only in the
GDP data: China, now the world’s largest exporter,
increased its share of exports to developing coun-
tries from 50 to 56 percent during 2009.1
Recovery in the advanced economies will probably
continue to be slowed down both by the unresolved
issues from before the crisis and the added difficul-
ties of unwinding the expansionary fiscal and mone-
tary policies that have been adopted during the cri-
sis.And no matter how necessary such policies have
been, the exit strategies they now require are not
going to be a stimulus for further growth.
To discuss the situation of Italy, first in the crisis and
now in the recovery, I begin in the next section with
a short discussion of the impact of the crisis on the
financial system.
The financial crisis: why not in Italy?
Although the crisis originated in US financial mar-
kets, and owed a large part of its global dimension
to the global connectedness between financial
institutions within and across
countries, the financial aspects
of the crisis came to Italy most-
ly as a side-show.This sets Italy
apart from other European
countries, where finance played
a much more important role in
both the local origin and the
spreading of the crisis.2 This is
particularly true for banks, an
issue which is worth examining
in more detail.
Banks’ losses …
In the United States, according
to a report by Credit Suisse in
January 2010, banks are facing
about USD 1.4 trillion of com-
mercial real estate (CRE)
loans maturing in the next four
years.Almost 55 percent of the
commercial mortgages that will mature until the
end of 2013 are currently ‘underwater’, meaning
the borrowers owe more than the value of the
property, according to the research company
Foresight Analytics.
For the euro area, the ECB had observed in its mid-
year review of 2009 that euro area banks could face
a total loss estimated at USD 649 billion over the
period 2007–10.At the end of May 2009,“the write-
downs on securities by euro area banks had amount-
ed to USD 215 billion.At the same time,in 2007 and
2008, euro area banks provisioned and wrote-off
USD 150 billion of their loan exposures. Looking
ahead, therefore, there is potential for euro area
banks to suffer a further USD 283 billion in losses,
mainly originating from loan exposures” (ECB
2009a, 103). More recent loss estimates, published in
December 2009, are bigger: “the total (i.e. already
reported and yet to come) write-downs for the euro
area banking system are likely to amount to around
€ 553 billion for the period 2007–10. Of this total,
cumulative total write-downs on exposures to securi-
ties are likely to amount to around €  198 billion,
while the predicted figure for total loan-losses is
around € 355 billion. […] Splitting the total loss fig-
ures into what has already been reported and what is
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2 Financial aspects of the crisis were of paramount importance in
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yet to come by the end of 2010, there is a potential
for euro area banks to suffer an additional € 187 bil-
lion in losses, mainly as a result of their loan expo-
sures” (ECB 2009b, 89).
In the crisis,banks have come under increased scruti-
ny and pressures by shareholders, market partici-
pants and regulators over their capital adequacy and
excessive leveraging. These pressures could be
accommodated in three directions: (i) re-capitaliza-
tion and increase in capital ratios; (ii) issuance of
safer or guaranteed liabilities; (iii) reduced lending,
especially to those debtors perceived to be more at
risk. In general, all “EU governments implemented
support measures to alleviate strains on their bank-
ing systems.These measures complement the exten-
sive liquidity support that has been provided by the
ECB” (ECB 2009a, 87).
… and de-leveraging
In particular, in reference to (i) above, capital ratios
of banks held up well, thanks partly to government
recapitalizations and especially to the quality and
composition of capital. This is also true of Italian
banks. The first five banking groups in Italy in-
creased their total capital ratio by 0.6 percent to
11 percent in June 2009, while their tier 1 ratio has
increased by 0.7 to 7.4 percent, compared to the
increase in the core tier 1 ratio by 0.8 percent to
6.6 percent.3 These ratios are still slightly below
those of comparable EU banks (ECB 2009a). On
the other hand, overall leverage for large Italian
banks is down to 24 (from 26 at the end of 2008);
this may be compared to the European average for
large banking groups, which amounts to 34. Re-
duced leverage is probably one reason why the
Italian banking system has been less and more mar-
ginally affected by the crisis, relatively to other
European banking systems.
A second reason is the reliance of Italian banks on a
stable deposit and funding base, with a much more
limited recourse to money market liabilities: in a
comparison of 27 banking groups in six European
countries (Britain, Italy, France, Germany, the
Netherlands and Spain) in June 2009, the average
ratio of (non-interbank) deposits and own bond lia-
bilities to total liabilities was 42.6 percent for the
other five countries, and 62 percent for Italy (data
courtesy of the European Banking Report Obser-
vatory of ABI4).
In Europe, many governments have been support-
ing banks through the issuance of guaranteed
bank bonds. These measures have been attractive
to banks especially in Britain, Spain, Ireland, Ger-
many and Austria, and to a lesser extent in
Sweden, the Netherlands and France. In Italy, a
similar initiative (called ‘Tremonti bonds’5) has
been largely ignored, as banks have preferred to
issue non-guaranteed bonds (about 50 billion
euros).This has been a clear sign of the strength of
the banking sector in Italy, as Italian banks could
raise credit at a lower cost (or with less condition-
ality) than if they had accepted the support of the
government.
Credit crunch? not here, thanks
Worldwide, several factors helped induce a con-
traction in the supply of bank loans: the scarcity of
bank capital; the mounting of on and off-balance
sheet losses; the deteriorating quality of creditors;
and pressures from regulators, politicians and mar-
ket participants alike, all asking banks to de-lever-
age. It would have been overly optimistic not to
expect a worldwide credit crunch. And thus it
came, despite the extreme laxity of monetary con-
ditions almost everywhere. The IMF estimated a
financing gap of about 460 billion euros for 2009 in
the euro area, and one of 150 billion euros for
Britain (IMF 2009a).
In Italy, the credit contraction has been less pro-
nounced than elsewhere: outstanding loans reached
a maximum around the summer of 2008, and have
decreased by only 0.2 percent in the 12 months to
November 2009 (Banca d’Italia 2010),although their
overall quality has also deteriorated.Several specific
measures have been adopted in Italy (in addition to
the bank bond guarantees discussed above) to stim-
ulate lending to private borrowers:
• State-guarantees and refinancing of the guaran-
tee funds to insure bank loans to small and medi-
um enterprises, and a revamped role for the
“Confidi” (consortia promoted by local entrepre- 3 See Banca d’Italia (2009).Total capital ratio is equal to the ratio
between a comprehensive measure of bank capital (total regulato-
ry capital,which includes tier 1,tier 2 and tier 3 plus supplementary
capital) and risk-weighted assets.Tier 1 capital includes core tier 1
(shareholders’ equity and retained reserves) plus hybrid capital
instruments. Leverage is the ratio between un-weighted assets and
total regulatory capital.
4 ABI is the Italian Banking Association.
5 See Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze-Dipartimento del
Tesoro (2009) and Panetta et al. (2009) for a documentation and
analysis of measures of bank support adopted worldwide.CESifo Forum 1/2010 47
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neurial associations to co-insure access of firms to
bank loans),
• Monitoring activity of credit conditions to be
enacted by the provincial government offices
(prefetture),
• The proposal of a new “Banca del Mezzogiorno”.
Of these, probably only state guarantees and the
role of the Confidi have been of great importance
in ensuring continued access to credit for small and
medium enterprises. This has helped to avoid an
overall contraction of credit flows in Italy. On the
other hand, the monitoring measures are likely to
have been irrelevant at best, while the proposal for
a new bank ‘for the South’ has not become opera-
tive yet and it is probably wise to be sceptical about
its design.6
The crisis and how it came to Italy
Thus, the way the crisis came to Italy (and to a
large part of Europe as well) was essentially
through the ‘real’ dimension. How did that hap-
pen? Why didn’t Europe decouple from the United
States? Let us focus on the euro area which had
already been a slow growth region at least since
1999.7 In 2009, exports and imports of the euro
area declined by 18 and 22 percent, respectively,
relative to those of 2008 – almost five and six times
more than the contemporaneous decline in GDP.
This was also a much larger fall relative to the
other advanced economies and to the emerging
and developing countries. And Italy’s exports and
imports (including those with the rest of the EU)
declined even more, by 22 and 23 percent, respec-
tively (see Table 2). This was presumably to be
expected, given the weak positioning of Italy’s
trade and its high sensitivity to the depreciation of
the dollar. Hence, while still waiting for a more
precise quantitative assessment, it appears that the
euro area’s recession was due in large part to the
fall in world – especially US – demand for euro
area exports, which quickly fed into the demand
for capital goods (the decline in gross fixed capital
formation in the euro area was probably more than
11 percent in 2009).
And although Europe’s economy held up a little
longer than in the United States, when the crash did
come the damage was even larger: in the euro area,
industrial production fell by 21 percent between
April 2008 (the peak of the previous expansion) and
April 2009 (the worst month of the crisis); in the
United States the fall was only 14 percent in the
same period. Italy took an even greater blow, minus
25 percent. Recovery has since been very slow and
even slower in the euro area than in the United
States (Table 3). Everywhere, the fall of production
is greater for capital goods industries.
How did the labor markets keep up as these unfa-
vorable events were unfolding? In the industrialized
world unemployment rates had been declining
almost everywhere since 2006, reaching a low of
4.3 percent in the United States in December 2006,
and of 7.2 percent in the euro area in May 2008. In
the second half of 2008 the trend turned upwards
almost everywhere, and by the end of 2009 unem-
ployment had reached 10 percent in the euro area,
8.8 in Italy, and 9.7 percent in the United States, and
the IMF is forecasting further deterioration in the
course of 2010 (see Table 4).
On both sides of the Atlantic, this crisis has been the
deepest one since the 1930s and bears little resem-
blance to other recessions experienced since the
Table 2 
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6 There is actually little or no evidence that banks with headquar-
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twelve months to November 2009 loans to the South have actually
been increasing by 2.5 percent (implying that the crunch, to the
extent that there was one, was only felt in the Centre-North).
7 Average real GDP growth in the euro area was 2.2 percent from
1999 and 2007, compared with 2.9 percent in the United States.
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Second World War. On the whole, the crisis in the
real economy came to the EU and the euro area just
a few months later than in the United States, but the
final impact is of a similar magnitude, although the
fall in aggregate demand and supply has been deep-
er on the European side, while the consequences on
the labor markets have been less harsh in the larger
European countries (with the exception of Spain)
than in the United States.
Fiscal stimulus
The reaction to the crisis has been quite fast every-
where. Generally speaking, it involved fiscal stimu-
lus, specific measures to sustain employment and
specific measures to deal with financial markets and
intermediaries. Here I look at the fiscal stimulus
from an aggregate viewpoint.In this perspective,sev-
eral facts ought to be noted from Table 5, based on
IMF estimates of October 2009. With the exception
of Germany, which delayed its response until 2009,
all countries in the table immediately and indeed
‘automatically’ reacted to the real contraction with a
fiscal expansion that amounted to 1.2 percent of
GDP for the euro area. This expansion further
strengthened to more than 5.6 and 6.0 percent in
2009 and 2010. For Italy, it amounted to 3.9 percent
in 2009 and 4.4 percent in 2010.It must be noted that
expansionary policies were also adopted, and with a
similar intensity, by all the major emerging
economies. In a related paper, the IMF also suggest
that in the advanced G20 economies discretionary
measures contributed less than one third to the stim-
ulus of 2009, and in particular that Italy basically
abstained from any discretionary stimulus, whereas
in Germany discretionary measures amounted to
more than 40 percent of the stimulus.8
Hence, the aggregate dimension of Italy’ stimulus
was essentially obtained by letting the automatic sta-
Table 4 
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8 See IMF (2009b). It is also useful to recall that, as soon as the cri-
sis developed, the European Commission drafted a plan for Euro-
pean economic recovery (see see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0800:EN:NOT,
26 November 2008). The main purpose of the plan was to recom-
mend to Member States an immediate budgetary expansion of 170
billion euros, adding into an overall stimulus of about 200 billion
euros,or 1.5 percent of the EU’s GDP.Although no formal process
of coordination took place, most countries – Italy included – pre-
sented their own, independently adopted fiscal maneuvers as con-
sistent with the European Commission’s (see Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes Submitted by Member States, http://ec.europa.
eu/economy_finance/thematic_articles/article10982_en.htm).
Overall progress is documented in http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/publications/publication15048_en.pdf. In all of these cases,
these measures imply a breach of the 3 percent threshold of budget
balances, to be maintained for a few years. Hence, the European
Commission was forced in the following months to begin for each
country an ‘excessive deficit procedure’,finding that in most cases–
Italy included – both the deficit and the debt criteria were ‘not to
be fulfilled’.The procedures initiated by the European Commission
are listed at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_
policy/excessive_deficit9109_en.htm.CESifo Forum 1/2010 49
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bilizers operate. This has been a sound choice and
the reason is apparent from the last two columns of
Table 5: simply by letting the stabilizers work, Italy’s
debt-to-GDP ratio, the highest in the EU, will
increase by 17 percentage points by the current year,
and by 25 percentage points by 2014,reaching almost
130 percent (by then, debt in the euro area will have
increased by 30 percentage points,in Britain and the
United States by approximately 45 percentage
points, but still, the US debt-to-GDP ratio of the
United States will be about 20 percentage points
lower than that of Italy). Note that in this perspec-
tive the debt positions of the main emerging coun-
tries are going to be even more conservative. Hence,
my point is quite simply that, if Italy had chosen to
conduct a more aggressive fiscal expansion, it would
now be hitting the headlines at a faster pace than the
news from Greece or Spain, and only thanks to the
conservativeness of the government in this respect it
is not.9
Of course, a standard response to these objections is
that debt will be paid back through faster growth or,as
Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel put it recently:
“we must pursue a growth path, otherwise we cannot
generate the needed savings [to pay for the debt]”.10
Nevertheless, Italy has a proven record of no-correla-
tion between fiscal profligacy and faster growth.
Did Italy do it right?
Italy’s room for (fiscal) maneuver was thus quite
limited. But was this small space put to a good use?
Let us take a few steps back and look at two aspects
that characterize fiscal policy and the budget proce-
dure in Italy.
Rising pressure 
Fiscal pressure in Italy has constantly been high (in
relative EU terms), and has actually been increasing
in the last three years (to reach 42.8 percent of GDP
in 2008).The huge bill for servicing the debt (which
had decreased from 11.5 percent in 1996 to 6.4 per-
cent in 2000, and then more slowly to 5.1 percent in
2008), is one cause, but clearly not the only one. A
rather schizophrenic set of decision making proce-
dures (which provides for a considerable regional-
ization of decisions, but only on the expenditure
side) and the coalitional nature of all Italian govern-
ments since at least the X legislature (July 1987)11
should perhaps also be kept in mind as causes of this
outcome.
Lengthening the horizon
Since the Berlusconi government took power (on
8 May 2008), and thus well before the crisis had
become apparent,the government has begun to adopt
a series of innovative measures in the field of public
finance.First,the new government confirmed the com-
mitment of the previous one (Prime Minister Prodi,
2006–2008) to reach a balanced budget by 2011 (the
so-called ‘stabilizzazione triennale del debito pubbli-
co’).And even at that time, it was clear that the main
route to achieve a stabilization had to be the contain-
ment of the ‘spontaneous’ growth of public expendi-
tures (‘Una politica di serio contenimento delle
dinamiche incrementali della spesa pubblica’, as it was
defined by the Economics Minister Giulio Tremonti in
a parliamentary speech on 25 June 2008).
Thus, the government confirmed the decision not to
adopt an expansionary stance even once the crisis
became apparent, although it did leave the automat-
ic stabilizers free to operate. This limited the aggre-
gate dimension of the fiscal stimulus, and created
some tensions both within the governing coalition
and between government and opposition.
A summary … 
Since the inception of the crisis the Italian govern-
ment has adopted numerous policy measures. A list
of the more important ones is contained in the
appendix. Here I assess them synthetically, compar-
ing their intended and likely achievements. First, the
overall impact on the public sector’s aggregate
receipts or outlays is likely to be small. In fact, fiscal
pressure is expected to rise from 42.8 percent of
GDP in 2008 to 43.0 percent in 2009 and then to
decrease only to 42.5 percent in 2010,while expendi-
tures (net of interest costs) are expected to rise from
40.4 percent in 2008 to 43.1 percent in 2009 and
42.7 percent in 2010. As we saw earlier on, this
increase is mostly due to automatic stabilizers.12
9 Also note that the cost of servicing Italy’s debt is already enor-
mous, above 5 percent of GDP (See Banca d’Italia 2010).
10 Quoted in the Financial Times, 26 October 2009.
11 On the relevance of coalitions in this context – see Hallerberg
(2004) and also Hallerberg et al. (2007).
12 It must be noted, however, that tax revenue on a cash basis
decreased by 2.6 percent or 10.6 billion euros, against increases of
9.6,4.8 and 0.7 percent in the three previous years.Revenue in 2009
was boosted by the extraordinary receipts from the one-off with-
holding taxes introduced by the first anti-crisis decree (Decree Law
185/2008) and the foreign assets disclosure scheme (Banca d’Italia
2010).CESifo Forum 1/2010 50
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A question arises, however, on their aggregate
impact over the longer run. In this respect, a sharp
criticism has been voiced Mario Draghi, the
Governor of the Banca d’Italia, in his remarks
before the parliament in July 2009.He observed that
2009 is the first after 18 years in which Italian public
finances would register a primary deficit (that is, an
excess of government expenditures over revenues,
even before accounting for interest expenses).While
he accepted the need for fiscal policy to accompany
the exit from the crisis, he also noted that the
“Documento di Programmazione Economica e
Finanziaria” (DPEF: Document for Economic and
Financial Planning) for 2010–2013 “does not include
information on the levels and composition of rev-
enues and expenditures”,which in turn “makes it dif-
ficult to evaluate some crucial aspects of the pro-
posed budgetary policy”.
The absence of this information is critical, since in
order to achieve the desired targets for deficits and
debts in 2013 it would have been necessary to cut
current expenditures in real terms during each year
until then, and any such cuts would go against the
recent experience (current primary expenditures
have been increasing by more than 2 percent per
year in real terms between 1999 and 2008). In this
context two challenges stand out in particular: one
coming from the ageing population (and the corre-
sponding increase in pension expenditures); the
other from the need to adopt a series of reforms to
strengthen the enterprise sector and restore condi-
tions for growth.
Second, the policy measures may be distinguished
into those (which could be termed ‘demand-side’)
meant to address the gravest aspects of the econom-
ic uncertainty caused by the crisis, and those (‘sup-
ply-side’) meant to address the long run, long over-
due problems of low productivity growth.
On the demand side, the relevant provisions are the
introduction of a ‘social card’ and a bonus for low-
income households.Also, the refinancing and exten-
sion of income subsidies for redundant workers
(‘Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’) goes in this direc-
tion. However, it must be noted that some of these
measures essentially re-invent previous commit-
ments:for instance,the re-financing and extension of
the Cassa Integrazione has taken the place of expen-
ditures for active labor market policies.
As regards the supply side or pro-growth measures,
the negative trend of labor productivity growth in
Italy, compared to the euro area, explains the need
for urgent action. Such action includes policies to
encourage labor productivity and to retrain tem-
porarily unemployed workers; to stimulate new
investments and to incentivize new entrepreneurs;to
raise the retirement age and to re-model the tax
pressure; to boost productivity in the public sector
and to provide a substantial improvement in public
(infrastructure) capital. However, with the possible
exception of measures to enhance productivity in the
public sector and infrastructures, it is doubtful
whether the scale of the policies adopted is propor-
tionate to the effort which is required to restore pro-
ductivity growth.
… and some critiques
The measures adopted by the government have been
subject to several criticisms, both within the govern-
ment coalition (where some ministers have explicit-
ly criticized the strict budget limits enforced by the
Economics Minister Giulio Tremonti), and by the
opposition (which, however, seemed keener on ask-
ing for more ‘debates’ in the parliament than on
proposing well structured alternatives).
Among the criticisms, those that advocate more
deficit spending, or a drastic reduction of the overall
tax levels,appear quite unreasonable,for the reasons
outlined above. Let us examine instead in more
detail some individual measures:
• Fiscal shield. The main purpose of this measure
was to induce tax evaders, who had illegally
exported funds, to repatriate them. This aroused
three main criticisms:(1) the tax rate (a flat 5 per-
cent) is too compliant towards tax evaders;
(2) there will be no request to recapture foregone
tax revenue; and (3) there will be no controls on
how the capital to be ‘shielded’ had been obtain-
ed in the first instance, so that in fact the shield
may encourage money laundering (see Giannini
and Guerra 2009). To some extent, these criti-
cisms appear justified. In particular, in a country
where social capital and civic duty have been
downgraded, it is fair to question whether it is
appropriate to indulge in efforts to re-legitimize
illegally-earned capital. On the other hand, as the
recent arguments with neighboring states (Swit-
zerland and San Marino) show, the adoption of
the fiscal shield is part of a wider strategy to get
tough on tax evaders (or at least against illegalCESifo Forum 1/2010 51
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capital exports): this effort is to be appreciated
and supported.
• Retirement age. Under pressure from the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the government adopted
measures that require public sector workers of
both genders to have the same retirement age by
2018.This actually introduces a disparity between
women in the public vs. private sector, and does
not address the main issue with respect to the
retirement age,which is to render the whole ques-
tion more flexible,with appropriate incentives for
those who want to retire at a later date.While it is
clear that the government did not want to con-
front the opposition of left-wing unions and
(within its own coalition) also of the Lega Nord
party, this has been in fact a missed opportunity.
This is particularly true given that a more radical
(and immediate) reform of the retirement age
would generally improve the long-run outlook of
public finances.
• Regional taxes. Although the government intro-
duced a new law on fiscal federalism (rather
vague, in fact, on empowering regions with fiscal
powers),it did not take the opportunity of the cri-
sis to redefine or rationalize the existing “region-
al” taxes, and especially IRAP.13 In fact, the crisis
could have been the appropriate time to rational-
ize this tax, but (despite some debates, even with-
in the government majority) the opportunity has
been missed.
• Shock absorbers. The government has essentially
refinanced shock absorbers, without introducing
radically new measures or reforms,and possibly at
the expense of funding alternative labor market
policies. This position has encountered two main
criticisms: (i) this was a lost opportunity to reform
the whole system, in order to adopt a more mod-
ern system of shock absorbers, which should be
focused on stimulating re-employment opportuni-
ties; and (ii) many unemployed persons do not
receive any compensation for lost jobs.
On the first point, the position expressed by a
government minister, that Italy has ‘a good sys-
tem of social shock absorbers’14 is surprising.
While the rate of unemployment has increased
from a low of 5.7 percent (August 2008) to
8.8 percent in December 2009, the number of
workers covered by the three forms of ‘Cassa
Integrazione’(ordinaria, straordinaria, in deroga),
and as such not included in the unemployed, has
reached a record level in the first nine months of
2009, probably above 600.000. Still, many tempo-
rary workers receive no benefits upon losing their
jobs (especially the so-called ‘Lavoratori coordi-
nati e continuativi a progetto’).
Some of the reform proposals in the spirit of
introducing a system of homogenous universal
benefits, should undoubtedly be explored with
more determination (Boeri and Garibaldi 2009).
On the other hand,it is also fair to say that a more
comprehensive system of unemployment bene-
fits,with an emphasis on re-employment,is a fair-
ly complex mechanism of incentives, and if im-
properly designed, it could easily yield perverse
results.Hence,it would be wiser to introduce such
a new system after adequate experimentation,
and not in the rush of a crisis.
On the second but related point, the question
arises why this crisis has not been used as an
opportunity to modify the law on labor contracts,
aiming at reducing the existing segmentation
between fully protected insiders and unprotected
outsiders.While the recent remarks of Economics
Minister Giulio Tremonti on the desirability of
‘permanent’ job positions could perhaps be inter-
preted as an ouverture to this option,it is unfortu-
nate that no serious debate on these issues is
apparently taking place, either within the govern-
ment or with the parliamentary opposition. Silvio
Berlusconi and other ministers have instead re-
emphasized the socially stabilizing role of the tra-
ditional Italian family:hardly a promising starting
point for a debate on how to restore dynamism
into the Italian productive sectors.
• Focus on growth and productivity. A criticism
related to the previous one is that the set of mea-
sures adopted, up to the Financial Law passed in
December 2009,lacks an overall focus on growth.
In the medium and long run, Italy’s problem is
not only to fight recession but to resume growth.
As Table 6 shows, Italy’s sluggishness in the last
decade (which has brought its GDP per capita
from 117.5 percent of the EU27 average in 1999
to 102 in 2008,and well below the euro area aver-
age) can be summarized by the abysmal perfor-
mance of labor productivity (on a hourly basis the
comparison would be even less flattering). In this
respect, while some of the adopted measures do
focus on infrastructure improvements and on tax
13 IRAP is a peculiar version of a corporate tax, as it includes also
the labor and interest costs in the tax base, and in many cases it
must be paid even after reporting a loss in the statement of profits.
On the other hand, this tax generates a large part of the resources
that fund the regional health services, thus it is rather difficult to
dispense with it.
14 See an interview with Renato Brunetta by Aldo Cazzullo,
Corriere della Sera, 7 March 2009, http://www.corriere.it/politi-
ca/09_marzo_07/intervista_brunetta_ammortizzatori_sociali_aldo_
cazzullo_382e8f6a-0ae2-11de-a3df-00144f02aabc.shtml.CESifo Forum 1/2010 52
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exemptions for new capital investments (the so-
called ‘Tremonti-ter’ law), as well as on boosting
labor productivity within the public sector, the
amount and type of the measures adopted to
stimulate productivity and competitiveness are
quite limited. And the way the shock absorbers
operate, by essentially ‘freezing’ employees in
their pre-existing jobs,might even reduce the abil-
ity of firms to adapt to the opportunities and chal-
lenges posed by the scenario post-crisis.15
On this point, however, the government has
stated its intention to propose new, specific laws
in the beginning of 2010 – although these are
still in the waiting room. Perhaps more impor-
tant, however, is that some crucial debates on
growth-related issues are now hitting the head-
lines. One is the question of criminality and cor-
ruption, and of their negative impact not only
on the ‘quality’ of life but also on economic per-
formance: on these issues, a new determination
and political consensus might be slowly emerg-
ing. The second is related to the refusal of car-
maker Fiat to accept an ‘exchange’ of govern-
ment subsidies for a commitment to keep an
obsolete plant going that is located in Sicily.
Both sets of issues might be conducive to more
productive ‘soul-searching’ exercises about the
causes of slow growth in Italy.
Dangers ahead and glimmers of local hope 
Several international indicators are suggesting that
the crisis is coming to an end: the US economy
returned to positive growth in the third quarter of
2009, and in November the European Commission
announced that the “recession is over but major
challenges persist”.16
A first challenge comes again from finances. The
financial crisis has not ended yet.According to the
IMF, write-downs on British bank assets are going
to be USD 604 billion, USD 814 billion for the
euro area and USD 1,025 billion for the United
States. These are enormous sums. They are espe-
cially enormous for Britain, given its small size, but
we have learned by now that it would be hard to
contain any new financial crisis on a local dimen-
sion. In this respect, it is worrisome that the engine
of structural and regulatory reforms seems to have
run out of steam.
The other main challenge stems from the fall of
the US dollar. A lower dollar is desirable, as it is
the only way to rebalance the United States cur-
rent account deficit vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
Hence we should and probably will live with a
weaker dollar relative to the euro.This is bad news
for Italy, however. Given its weak export base, a
lot of industrial restructuring will be needed
before Italy can adjust to a stronger euro. This
adjustment will cause pain but it could be helped
by proper measures to help firms restructure and
consolidate. And this will require more labor
mobility and more organizational flexibility –
which in turn will call for new social shock
absorbers and new labor contracts, as well as a
reform of the retirement age and an improvement
of educational standards, as well as an enforce-
ment of the ‘rule of law’ adequate to that of an
advanced economy.
In the end it all fits together: global challenges
require (also) local reforms, and we should realize
Table 6 
Labor productivity per person employed  
(GDP in PPS per person employed relative to EU27, EU27 = 100)







































































15An interesting (albeit negative) observation is that,based on data
from the Innobarometer, Italy is one of the EU countries where
firms have been induced to cut more from their innovation invest-
ments after the current recession (see Archibugi and Filippetti
2010). 16 See http://ec.europa.eu/news/economy/091103_en.htm.CESifo Forum 1/2010 53
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this sooner rather than later.At least a reasonable
division of labor is emerging. On the financial
challenge, which is inherently global, Italy has
some voice, but no real options. On the real econ-
omy challenge, Italy has a voice but could also
exercise some options.The internal political econ-
omy for these options is not great, but affordable.
And although a few opportunities have been
missed, some appropriate measures have been
taken. But many and more resolute ones should
still be taken, and serious discussions are hopeful-
ly about to begin.
Appendix: main policy measures adopted by the
Italian government during the crisis 2008–2009
Economic measures adopted during 2008 
• Decree No. 93, 27 May 2008; turned into Law No.
126, 24 July 2008:
– Abolition of ICI (local property tax) for owner-
occupied houses, and
– Partial tax exemption of overtime work.
• Decree No. 112, 25 June 2008; turned into Law
No. 133, 6 August 2008:
–  Adoption of a 3-year growth plan, aiming at
concentrating the resources for underdeveloped
areas (‘FAS’) on selected projects,17
– Adoption of a program for ‘strategic’ infrastruc-
tures,18
– Re-modulation of the tax base for banks, insur-
ances, and energy companies (so-called ‘Robin
Hood tax’),19
– Introduction of a ‘social card’ to subsidize basic
consumption of the low income earners, and
– Introduction of an ‘industrial plan’ to increase
labor productivity within the public sector.
• Decree No. 185, 29 November 2008; turned into
Law No. 2, 28 January 2009:
– Bonus for low-income households,
– 3 percentage points reduction of the corporate
and regional (IRAP) tax,
– Confirmation and strengthening of tax exemp-
tions in favor of ‘productivity wages’, a refi-
nancing of social shock absorbers, and
– Financing and ‘speeding up’ of procedures for
several large-scale or strategic infrastructures.
The first months of 2009
Under the heavy pressure of the crisis, some new
measures were adopted, which substantially con-
firmed and reinforced those previously adopted:20
• Law No. 15, 4 March 2009:
– Incentives to improve labor productivity in the
public sector.21
• Law No. 42, 5 May 2009:
– Fiscal federalism.22
Regarding fiscal federalism it must be remarked
that, although it will possibly become – in the long
run – the most pervasive reform of all those adopted
in the year, its effects on the current situation are in
fact nil.
Another relevant act at the beginning of 2009 was
the signing of an agreement (sponsored by the gov-
ernment) between the Confindustria (Employers
Association) and the Trade Unions (with the exclu-
sion of the more left-oriented CGIL) to reform wage
bargaining in the private sector. The agreement
introduces a two-level bargaining (national and ‘sec-
ond level’) system,adopts a new reference European
price index, sets a three-year length for all contracts,
and confirms the tax exemptions on overtime.
Measures adopted during the summer of 2009
The government Decrees No. 78 of 1 July 2009 and
No. 103 of 3 August 2009, which were respectively
turned, with several changes and additions, into the
Law No. 102 of 3 August 2009 and the Law No. 141
of 3 October 2009, contain several new measures:23
• Tax exemptions for new capital investments (the
Tremonti-ter),
• An ‘Employment Prize’ for workers receiving
income subsidies (such as the Cassa Integrazione)
that will be employed in training projects with the
same employer who put them under benefits,
• Re-funding of the system of ‘social shock
absorbers’,
• Incentives for new self-entrepreneurs,







20A detailed list of the most relevant laws and decisions adopted in
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• Regularization of certain types of illegal immi-
grants (if employed in home services),
• A ‘moratorium’ on mortgage payments due by
firms to banks, and
• Introduction of a new ‘fiscal shield’ (immunity
from prosecution, in return for the payment of a
flat 5-percent tax) for foreign investments previ-
ously undeclared to the fiscal authorities.
The Financial Law of 2010
A somewhat confused debate has taken place since
the presentation of the government proposal of the
Financial Law, which took place in September
2009.24 The discussion between the two parliament-
ary chambers ended on 22 December 2009, after a
‘confidence vote’ required by the government to cut
short the debate. In the end, the government pro-
posed, and the parliament approved, to use the rev-
enue from the fiscal shield – probably in the order of
5 billion euros,and only for 2010 – to finance a num-
ber of measures (in areas like large infrastructure
investments, tax credit for R&D expenditures, refi-
nancing of shock absorbers, compensating local
authorities for the loss of revenue from property
taxes, and the institution of a new Banca del
Mezzogiorno aimed at providing financial means
for the development of the Southern Regions).
These measures do not alter the macroeconomic
picture, with a net indebtedness of the public sector
of 5.3 percent of GDP in 2009, and 5.0 percent in
2010 (while the change in GDP is finally estimated
at – 4.8 percent in 2009, and + 0.7 in 2010).
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